strömmingen kirjoitti: ↑Ti Loka 06, 2020 8:47 pm
En siis puolustele. Mutta ehdotan että itse pysähdyt miettimään mikä rooli onnettomuustutkinnalla on. Ei se hylyn jälkihoito kuulu sille millään tavalla. Se mitä Ruotsi teki peitelläkseen epämääräistä lastia on ihan toinen juttu joka ei liity onnettomuustutkintaan.
Ehkä olen sitten käsittänyt ihan väärin, että mitä onnettomuustutkinnan pitäisi saada aikaiseksi. Ajattelen katsos itse, että onnettomuustutkinta selvittää tapahtuneen syyt ja miten tapahtumat ovat edenneet. Kuten tämä onnettomuustutkintakeskuksen M/S Estonia raportti esittää tekevänsä, toki.
Se mikä minua tässä hämää on se, että jos tutkimuksen aikana käy ilmi asioita, jotka sotivat omaa hypoteesia vastaan tai vaativat lisäselvityksiä, miksi niitä ei tehdä? Kuten esimerkiksi nämä rampin kaiteet. Kyllä varmasti Otkesin pojat on myös nähneet videot, jossa rampin kaiteet ovat irti. Jos selitys näille on se, että autokantta käytiin tutkimassa, miksei sitä kerrota raportissa?
Näin suuressa inhimillisessä tragediassa on katsos vastuu tutkijalla totuudenmukaisen tiedon tuottamisessa, koska se koskettaa henkilökohtaisesti tuhansia ihmisiä. Selviytyjiä ja heidän omaisiaan, kuolleita ja heidän omaisiaan. Sen lisäksi kyseessä on vielä kansallinen trauma. Monikohan meistä on pelännyt autolautan kyydissä johtuen M/S Estonian uppoamisesta? Veikkaan, että aika moni, minut voitte laskea mukaan.
Kysymys ei siis ole mistään "jälkihoidosta" vaan tiedontuontannosta, joka antaa ihmisille rauhan. Nythän tämä asia on hoidettu niin, että rauhaa ei saa vielä edes 26 vuoden jälkeenkään perkele.
Tästä voit lukea vuonna 1996 Meyer Werftin lähettämän kirjeen tätä M/S Estonia tutkintaa johtaneelle ruotsalaiselle Börjelle. Kopioin tähän sen loppupäätelmät, koko höskä tosiaan löytyy täältä, jakautuu kahdelle sivulle eli klikatkaa seuraava kun pääsette sivun loppuun:
https://www.estoniaferrydisaster.net/es ... .4.471.htm
Conclusion
Based on the above summarised and partly commented statements of relevant passengers and crew members it has to be concluded that the "Sequence of Events" must have been somewhat different from what the International Commission has so far submitted and also what the authors Anders Hellberg and Anders Jörle assume in their book "Katastrofen Kurs". This can only be explained by the apparent fact that neither the Commission nor the authors have - so far - carefully scrutinised the passengers' statements which - in combination with the statements of the crew members from the engine department - do explain what and when it happened.
The detailed evaluation of the testimony available to us indicates that
(a) there was water on the cardeck well before the casualty sequence-of-events commenced;
(b) there were certain quantities of water on the 1st Deck, i.e. deck below cardeck, in particular in the forward part, already before the sudden starboard list started;
(c) the vessel's trim had changed since the departure from Tallinn from down by the stern to down by the bow because of the full visor, and the water having entered the cardeck via the damaged bow ramp and other openings;
(d) there had been severe crash noises on the cardeck at approximately 00h45/00h50 and probably the bow ramp was smashed open from the inside of the cardeck, but was prevented from falling into the visor by its hydraulic cylinders resisting the opening movements, however, the water quantities streaming onto the cardeck from the full inside of the visor rapidly increased;
(e) this was apparently reported to those on the bridge by Silver Linde and the speed was reduced and the bow turned into the wind/sea, i.e. to port, the starboard list increased slightly simultaneously Silver Linde was instructed to close the bow ramp hydraulically;
(f) After having started the hydraulic pumps, he may have mixed up the handles on the panel and activated the actuator of the visor which broke at first the much weakened hinges at starboard and subsequently the port ones, followed by the side locks, whilst the Atlantic lock remained intact for the time being;
(g) the visor was then moving forward/aft between the hinge plates at vessel's side and the deck beam at frame 159 which created the noises compared by many passengers and crew to a sledge-hammer beating against the hull, the gap on forecastle deck as well as at both sides opened and closed and the water penetration into visor and, consequently, also through the partly open bow ramp onto the cardeck increased substantially;
(h) the vessel took a sudden and considerable starboard list at 01h02 which after ca. 2 minutes was already 20°: which required 800 ts water on the cardeck, the list increased further.
(j) the vessel continued to turn to port, but more rapidly because with the increasing starboard list the still active starboard stabilizer fin took over the function of a rudder blade and made the vessel turn to port (fin is down to counter the starboard listing) rather quickly whilst the rudder blades, although being at hard astarboard, had little or no effect due to the list compared to the stabilizer fin, list had exceeded 30° at about 01h10 and the main engines stopped;
(k) the visor broke off and the ramp was totally open at about 01h15 when the list was in excess of 40°, auxiliaries stopped and the emergency generator started, the stabilizer fins stopped moving up and down;
(l) the vessel, stabilized at a list of between 40°-50°, was then already heading approximately SE, i.e. the funnel pointing in the direction where the wind came from;
(m) the vessel was on her side at 01h31 when also the emergency generator stopped.
(n) It has to be assumed that the visor separated from the vessel at about 01h15 (was probably seen by Margus Treu on the monitor) and that the Atlantic lock broke shortly before as is demonstrated by the bending to of the visor lug to starboard.
In summary of the 75 pages before it has to be concluded that the primary cause of the casualty is the
a.) water filled visor in combination with the damaged/leaking bow ramp which - under the prevailing circumstances and by the impossibility to adjust any starboard list as the port ballast tanks were already full upon sailing - led to a slowly flooding of parts of the cardeck including down flooding into 1st Deck and
b.) that the extremely hard setting-in of vessel's bow into short high seas from port ahead created by the vessel proceeding under the circumstances at too high speed caused improper and/or not at all secured cars to crash against the bow ramp - also being improperly secured - which became pushed open allowing even larger quantities of water to enter the cardeck.
The subsequent attempt by crew members to close the ramp and to hold down the visor hydraulically failed totally and led to breaking of the visor hinges
- by its extremely weak condition due gross negligent repair attempts
- which further increased the water ingress through the partly open bow ramp and led to a sudden 20° starboard list. Due to the continuously streaming-in of water through the partly open bow ramp
- the vessel was meanwhile on a south-easterly heading due to the rudder effect of the starboard stabilzer fin with her deep starboard side now exposed fully to wind/sea
- the list increased until the vessel stabilized for some time at between 40°-50°, and thereafter quickly listed to 90°. The visor separated from the vessel probably at about 01h15 and the bow ramp was fully open for some time which certainly increased the water ingress onto cardeck even more, however, at that time the vessel had a list of ca. 40° already with all 4 main engines shut-off and lying with the deep starboard side exposed to the heavy beam seas, thus being in a hopeless condition with capsizing/sinking being just a question of minutes.
Tämä siis osoituksena siitä, että jo ennen oman raporttinsa julkaisua Meyer Werft koitti saada JAIC:a huomioimaan esimerkiksi selviytyjien kokoemukset paremmin. JAIC julkaisi oman raporttinsa neljä vuotta tämän jälkeen, tietenkin selviytyjien sanomisia vääristellen kuten muutama sivu sitten tuli osoitettua.
Veikkaan että paikalta on haettu arkaluonteinen lasti. Tähän viittaa myös väittämät ettei autokannelle ole mitään asiaa sukeltajien turvallisuuden vuoksi vaikka sieltä on sukellusmateriaalia.
