Näitä Jutta Raben ottamia näytteitä kokasta löytyneestä reiästä on siis tutkittu todella monessa eri paikassa, jossa on ollut ammattilaisia asialla, ei muh keulaviisiirii -trolleja. Kopioin tähän heidän sanomisiaan ja muutamia raportteja aiheesta.
Noniin, tässä yllä siis tiivistelmä Brian Braidwoodin analyysistä, jonka koko raportti löytyy meikäläisen viestistä linkattuna hieman ylempää. Sitten jatketaan seuraavaan instituuttiin ja tällä kertaa kysytään asiaa tohtori Neubertilta, joka hänkin näitä Juttan koepaloja on tutkinut.Lieutenant Commander (ret.) Brian Braidwood joined the German ‘Group of Experts’ in February 1999 as diving and explosion expert because there were rather strong indications that there might have been explosions in the foreship area and elsewhere onboard the Estonia prior to her sinking.
Lt. Commander Braidwood qualified as a Naval diver in 1957 and spent twenty-five years as an Explosive Ordnance Disposal specialist with the British Navy. This included the Defence of Ships Against Sabotage Attack, three years commanding the Far East Clearance Diving Team, and the Diving School, based in Singapore, responsible for all Diving and Explosive Ordnance Disposal, both operational and training, east of Suez. He also qualified with the Army in the Disposal of Terrorist Devices, commanded the UK Joint Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal School for three years and trained 750 students each year, ranging up to Lieutenant Colonel level, from the UK and overseas.
For the last thirteen years of service he was the Navy’s specialist for new demolition and explosive disposal equipment and techniques, which included testing commercial and military explosives and required a close liaison with many military and civilian organisations throughout the world.
Since he commenced working with us Lt. Commander Braidwood has made himself acquainted with the condition of the wreck and the merits of the case by prolonged watching of video footage, studying drawings and reports as well as long discussions with our expert team, where after he drew up his Investigation Report. – See Chapter 34.7 of our Report. Only thereafter, viz. in August 2000 after completion of the Rabe/Bemis diving expedition, the samples cut off the wreck were brought ashore for examination.
Sample 1 was entrusted to the Material Testing Laboratory (MPA) Brandenburg while sample 2 was handed over to the DN Institute, Clausthal-Zellerfeld (DN), for non destructive examinations.
Several weeks later the MPA Brandenburg presented its first results indicating that the tip of the sample had been affected by detonation. Sample 2 also showed destructions evidently caused by very high deformation velocity, which, however, could not clearly be defined as having been caused by detonation. Subsequently sample 1 was also examined by DN with the same positive results which were subsequently also confirmed by the South Research Institute, San Antonio, Texas/USA.
Brian Braidwood visited the MPA Brandenburg and exchanged views and discussed the examination results and methods used with the responsible persons in this Institute, i.e. Professor Ziegler, Dr. Nega and Dipl. Engineer Mettel. He also met and discussed the findings of the MPA Brandenburg with Martin Volk, the retired explosive expert of the City of Berlin.
Lt Commander Braidwood is working from his home office in Weymouth/UK but was closely informed and received the relevant documentation – translated into English – as soon as received.
His findings in the field of explosives in connection with the ESTONIA were frequently discussed with the also ex-military explosive expert Michael Fellows, who presented a paper at the AgnEf Seminar in Stockholm in May 2000 with the title “A Second Opinion on the Explosion Damage Report on the Car/Passenger Ferry Estonia by Brian Braidwood”. Michael Fellows concluded:
“I agree with Braidwood that on a balance of probabilities:
An explosion caused the damage in the longitudinal bulkhead of the manual lock access space by the Starboard side of the car deck. An explosion also caused the damage extending down the forward bulkhead from the Starboard side locks. An explosion caused the damage to the Starboard side of the bow ramp below the level of “B” deck.”
Lt. Commander Braidwood prepared an “Investigation Report” for us in March 1999 and a “Supplementary Investigation Report” in August 1999 which are attached as Enclosures 34.7.435 and 34.7.435.1 to our Report.
Before this background he was requested to comment on the results achieved by the different institutes after the examination of samples 1 and 2, which he did as follows:
Sample No. 1 was handed over to the MPA on 01.09.2000 and tested from 08.-28.09.00. The results were outlined in their first Report No. 1.3./00/3664 – see Enclosure 3 - of which the following shall be quoted:
»The strained micro-section specimens from the fracture area of the starboard front bulkhead show an extensive destruction of the initial structure components. These plastic deformations within the micro range indicate exposure to extremely heavy shock forces, such as happens from the effect of a substance detonating.
The resulting heat, which is created during such a shock by the internal friction whilst overcoming the sliding resistance, is responsible for the changes within the structure. Since the sliding does not occur in phases but undulatively (as a consequence of the movements of displacements) this is also recognisable as undulative formation of the structural parts. Already at a distance of ca. 9 cm from the specimen strained strongest only little change to the structural characteristics were established.
Based on these results it is probable that the main strained area is to be found at another part of created hole.
………………..
There are significant differences of the structure conditions in the micro sections of the specimens recognisable which depend on the place from where the specimens were taken.
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The structure of specimen 13/00/3664 G022 shows significant changes in way of the fracture edge area (pictures 26-33). These plastic deformations in the micro range do indicate exposure to extremely heavy shock forces such as happens from the effects of a substance detonating. The resulting heat, which is created during such a shock by the internal friction whilst overcoming the sliding resistance, is responsible for the changes within the structure. Since the sliding does not occur in phases but undulatively (as a consequence of the movements of displacements), this is also recognisable as undulative formation of the structural parts (pictures 26-33). The shearing bands created are in particular clearly visible on the pictures 27 and 28. The initial structural parts are extensively destroyed. On the overview of the micro section of specimen 13/00/3664 G022, pictures 24 and 25, the undulative condition of the structural parts is recognisable also in the macro range. The undulative condition of the fracture edge is located at the inside of the bulkhead.
Whether the jagged lines on the right hand side of picture 32 indicate internal cracks has to be established by further examinations.The in volume panel-shaped iron carbide parts of the perlite are unable to resist the strong micro processes. The destruction of this perlite, marked on the micro section as lamellar structure, becomes particularly clear on pictures 29, 31 and 33. A destruction of the lamellae has occurred which cannot occur by any comparable mechanical technological influence. The processes of explosive treatments of metallic materials as for example explosive hardening and explosive cladding have to be excluded. These processes show in surface-near areas comparable effects.
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It has to be concluded that the pressure waves also in areas, where by means of light microscopes, only little deformation is recognisable, did result in hardening due to structure deformation in the micro range; (deformation of the perlite grain, change of the solidification density).«
The MPA carried out further examinations on the same sample from 10.-26.10.00 which are outlined in Report No. 1.3/00/3669 – see Enclosure 4. The results and conclusions are summarised as follows:
»On consideration of all the examinations carried out the highest strains recognisable by the change of the structural parts in the above explained way, has been determined at specimen 1.3/00/3664 GO22.
All the other micro-sections do support these results.
They do not, however, show the strong changes as e.g. the wavy change of the structure in the areas near the fracture and the destruction of the initial structure arrangement. The plastic changes in the micro area, indicating an extremely strong shock effect, such as occurs during detonations, are recognisable in all specimens.
A general characteristic for a detonation is the destruction of the shell type build-up of the perlite. In the pictures made by SEM it is apparent that the cementite of the perlite did not coagulate, which would have indicated the influence of heat alone, but the lamellar structure was changed beyond recognition by mechanical strain. Internal cracks which are also characteristic of shocks from strain by detonations could not be proved by the topographic examinations performed.
Also the increase of hardness indicates a hardening of the material which also appears during detonations.
The results obtained do allow the conclusion that the positions most affected by the detonation was in another area of the damaged material. In the following all the examination results are outlined again, which, according to our experience, do occur when there has been a detonation:
the appearance of parallel shear bands (Neumann bands)
changes respectively destruction of the cementite lamellas in the perlite
hardness increase
plastic deformation in the micro area (wavy arrangement of the structure parts)
The characteristics, determined during the examinations, which are consistent with the effects of a detonation, allow the conclusion, that the deformation velocity in the material must also have been in the detonation range. It is not possible to state the actual speed because it depends on a number of unknown influence factors, as e.g. the extent of transmission losses. Its lower limit in the case of a detonation should be about 1000 m/sec.«
The conclusions drawn by Brian Braidwood from the examination results of the MPA-Brandenburg read as follows:
The structural deformation of Sample 1 could only have been causes by an explosion.
The increase in hardness measured in Sample 1 could only have been caused by an explosion.
Overall, the findings of this technical report are further evidence that there was an explosion in the ESTONIA, in the vicinity of the starboard forward bulkhead from which Sample 1 was taken.
Seuraavaksi poistutaan Euroopasta ja mennään Ameriikan Yhdysvaltojen Texasin osavaltioon. Siellä asiantuntija totesi seuraavaa:Initially only Sample 2 was handed over to the scientist in charge, Prof. Dr. Neubert, which however could not be examined fully as is explained by Prof. Neubert below:
»Since non-destructive testing was to be carried out the fracture edges and the uninfluenced basic material of both samples were examined by means of roentgenization. Due to the size of sample No. 2 testing by means of synchrotonradiance was considered to be appropriate because by this method the sample could be examined in its original condition. The testing condition and the results are laid down in the Preliminary Report DN 20130-01 “Examinations of a Shipbuilding Steel”. In summary it can be concluded that directly at the fracture edge of sample No. 2 areas with extremely massive deformation were found. The deformation area still to be proved has a thickness of about 100 µm. By means of the Scherrer formula the crystal size at the measuring point was calculated from the half height breadth of the results of the roentgenization. The calculations revealed that crystal size in way of the fracture-near area is smaller by factor x compared to the areas of uninfluenced material, a clear indication for a very high degree of deformability respectively a very high deformation velocity. More detailed statements cannot be made because for this roentgenization photographs made by roentgen rays with a longer wave length, e.g. copper Kα, would be required.«
The Institute received, subsequently, the relevant specimen of Sample 1 for further testing from the MPA Brandenburg which proved comparable results as obtained by the MPA and the conclusions by Prof. Neubert read as follows:
»The roentgenographical verification of martensite in way of the actual fracture edge leads to the conclusion that the areas of this microstructure became austenised during the deformation process several years ago, i.e. have been heated to a temperature of more than 700°C.
By combining the results of the roentgenographical measurements with the research results published with regard to the influence of deformation velocities on the change of structure of non-alloyed carbon-steels, a deformation velocity between 1,000 to 10,000. m/s has to be considered for the present case. According to the relevant literature such a range of velocities can only be achieved by detonations and/or shootings.«
Brian Braidwood arrived at the following conclusions:
»Any explosion will produce very high temperatures in the immediate vicinity of the explosion. In the case of high explosives, the temperatures would be consistent with the figure of 700 degrees C quoted in this report.
The velocity of detonation or VOD of a normal high explosive is about 6,500 m/s. This is consistent with the range of velocities quoted in the Clausthal-Zellerfeld report.
The findings of this technical report are further evidence that the damage to the starboard forward bulkhead in the “Estonia” was caused by the detonation of a high explosive charge.
From the second (Clausthal-Zellerfeld) technical report, I conclude that:
The massive structural deformation visible in the specimen from Sample 1 (running number 1.3/00/3664 GO2 2) was indisputably caused by an explosion.
The clear indication of a very high degree of structural deformation found in Sample 2 was indisputably caused by an explosion.
Overall, the findings of this technical report are further evidence that there was an explosion on the “Estonia”, in the vicinity of the starboard forward bulkhead from which Sample 1 and Sample 2 were taken.«
Sitten palataan takaisin Berliiniin, jossa tulee tämä ainoa tutkimus, joka lopulta todettiin todenneen, ettei räjähdystä ole tapahtunut:This Institute received via Jutta Rabe/Gregg Bemis two specimen cut from Sample No. 1 by the MPA and their preliminary opinion reads as follows:
»Direct evaluation of the fracture surface on one of the two samples was attempted by removal of corrosion product using cathodic cleaning, followed by examination via scanning electron microscopy. This proved unfruitful, since the original fracture topography was found to be almost completely obliterated by corrosion. Nevertheless, the angled geometry of both fracture surfaces, combined with subsequent metallographic observations, clearly indicated fracture by a shearing mechanism due to tensile overload.
Item 1, a small section that had been taken from the triangular sample by a transverse cut through its fracture surface, was prepared for metallographic examination. This revealed distinct evidence of deformation twinning in the plastically deformed region near the fracture surface. In ferrite steels such as the present bulkhead material this phenomenon is associated with high strain rate and/or low temperature deformation. We do not yet have the necessary data to specify a strain rate below which it would not occur in this particular steel at the approximately 45°F temperature of the Estonia tragedy. However, I believe at this point it is valid to say that an explosion was far more likely than a mechanical loading event to have produced the observed micro structural feature. This interpreta-tion is consistent with the localization of plastic strain along the fracture surface, which is a characteristic of elevated strain rates as well as the “petalled” appearance of the edge of the hole in the bulkhead. We are in the process of conducting additional tests and examinations to validate this conclusion.«
The conclusion of this preliminary examination was that “it is valid to say that an explosion was far more likely than a mechanical loading event to have produced the observed micro structural features”.
We do not know whether this Institute ever went deeper into the investigation and/or received other specimen from the area of Sample No. 1 having been closer to the explosion site, nor do we know whether the Institute ever produced a final report.
We did not submit this rather meagre result to Brian Braidwood and have only taken it up in this Report since the involvement of the Southwest Institute has been reported by the media. In any event, it is a further indication for an explosion to have occurred behind the starboard upper front bulkhead of the ESTONIA, although by far not as strong as the MPA and the DN Institute findings.
Sitten palaan Britteihin. Tällaista sanomaa tulee sieltä:This Institute with about 4000 employees is on federal level engaged in the testing and treating of all sorts of materials including e.g. firecrackers. It has several departments specialised in metallography and metallurgy and is also the highest German authority for the approval of explosive substances.
When the results of the MPA Brandenburg and the DN Institute had more or less clearly proven that there had been an explosion and the Southwest Institute had, at least, produced nothing to the contrary, Stefan Aust, Chief Editor of Der Spiegel and Spiegel-TV, decided – before giving green light for the publication – to consult the Federal Criminal Authority (BKA) and was recommended to consult the BAM before going public. This was early October 2000 and after the BAM had decided to accept the job and had received green light from the Chancellor’s office and all the relevant Ministries a meeting was held on 20.10.00 at the BAM in the Berlin, chaired by Dr. Klingbeil and Dr. Klinger and attended by seven further BAM employees engaged in explosives metallography and metallurgy as well as Stefan Aust and Thomas Schäfer from Spiegel, Jutta Rabe and Kaj Holmberg from Top Story, Martin Volk and Werner Hummel for this ‘Group of Experts’.
In preparation of the meeting Spiegel had handed over the examination reports of the MPA Brandenburg and the DN Institute, which were consequently known to the BAM participants. It was obvious from the very beginning that they looked at the MPA results and the DN results with extreme reservation and as a matter of fact one of the two explosive experts Dr. Österle even considered the results to be “very risky”. According to Stefan Aust the instructions to BAM were:
“It has to be determined whether the deformations of the specimen have been caused by detonative influences.”
At the meeting Stefan Aust also handed over Samples No. 1 and 2, respectively what was left of Sample No. 1, because the specimens cut off from this sample by the MPA Brandenburg at the beginning were kept by them and only subsequently, after the negative results of BAM became known, submitted to the BAM however not examined and consequently not included in the BAM investigation results.*
Therefore it was not surprising when BAM after having performed numerous explosion and mechanical tests to the shipbuilding steel supplied by the Meyer Werft announced 2½ months later: “All the examined structural characteristics do point to deformation caused by mechanical load, however that does not exclude that there could have been detonations in other parts of the starboard front bulkhead of the Estonia.”
The report comprises 113 pages and was available in the Internet in 2001 in German.
Needless to say that the MPA Brandenburg and Prof. Neubert/DN Institute protested against this comparison of apples with pears because the specimen, in which both Institutes had determined without any doubt the characteristics of detonations, had not been included in the BAM examination, although they were offered and finally even accepted by them.
Although advised accordingly this obvious ignorance was ignored by Spiegel and Spiegel TV who went public in January 2001 and almost managed to destroy the explosion theory. The BAM project manager Dr. Klinger went so far to state before running cameras: “It can be excluded that there has been an explosion in the area of the starboard front bulkhead of the Estonia”, although the BAM Report strictly confines this statement to the samples examined and does not exclude possible detonations at other locations of the front bulkhead.
One of the many questions raised after the Spiegel publications was: “Why does the BAM behave the way they do and why were they from the beginning already so adverse to the findings of the other Institutes?”
Brian Braidwood explains his “general impression” about the BAM work as follows:
»When any client asks a technical organisation to examine metal samples for signs of an explosion, they can expect that the staff involved will carry out their examination and base their conclusions on past experience.
The overall impression from the work carried out by BAM is that they lacked the experience necessary to make any valid conclusions. They then set out on a learning exercise to establish the effects of explosions on the many large samples of modern ship-building steel supplied to them. This meant conducting a long and complex series of mechanical and explosive tests which were recorded on video and used as a basis for the Spiegel TV coverage. BAM also examined and reported on some, but not all, of the samples taken from the Estonia.«
and he continues:
BAM access to other reports
Before BAM wrote their report they had access to all the reports from Brandenburg, including the Neubert Report, which is the report from Clausthal-Zellerfeld, and also a brief report from the South West Research Institute. From this report, they should not have been surprised at the lack of any significant twinning or hardening effects in the "Holland Profile" sample from the Estonia. In contrast, they would have been able to see that Brandenburg saw very significant twinning and hardening effects near the point of the triangular Estonia sample, which would have been nearest the centre of the hole. These effects diminished towards the opposite side of the triangle which was cut by a torch.
BAM failure to test all samples
When BAM received Sample 1, without the specimens inadvertently retained by Brandenburg, they had the part which was least likely to be affected by an explosion since it was the part furthest from the centre of the hole in the bulkhead. They then concluded that their tests of this incomplete sample showed no signs of an explosion. They then completely ignored any tests of the specimens from Sample 1, later supplied to them by Brandenburg. This extraordinary lapse occurred despite the fact that BAM had access to all the Brandenburg test results. They would therefore have known that these specimens showed far greater signs of the effects of an explosion.
BAM Report shortcomings and false conclusions
From the above paragraphs, it can be seen that the BAM Report has a number of shortcomings. For example, BAM attempts to discount the possibility of an explosion because the effects they saw in the Estonia samples they examined, could have been caused by something else. They say these could have been a result of the original cleaning treatment or some mechanical damage, "and therefore could not have been caused by an explosion."
Despite access to all other relevant test reports and against the instructions of their client, BAM seem to have completely ignored the samples that were likely to show the greatest effects of twinning and hardening.«
The complete Report of Brian Braidwood is attached as Enclosure 5.
Also the MPA Brandenburg as well as Professor Neubert/DN Institute felt confronted and took position.
The opinion of the MPA is expressed in a 6-page memo “Considerations concerning the MPA Examination reports in comparison to the BAM-Opinion, BAM V 3/187”, dated 08.02.01 from which the following is quoted:
»Reason:
Results and conclusions of the BAM Report do differ significantly from those of the MPA.
Thereafter the MPA, having in detail compared the BAM findings with their own findings and those of the other institutes, finally arrives at the conclusion that:
The examination results of all 3 institutes arrive convincingly at the conclusion that a detonative effect on the examined sample is most probable and cannot be clearly denied. Therefore the MPA sees no reason to change its so far found and interpreted results.
The complete memo is attached (only in German) as Enclosure 6.
Also Professor Neubert of the DN Institute submitted his opinion as to the BAM Report in a 3-page letter dated 12.02.01 which is attached (in German) as Enclosure 7.
In addition to criticising insufficient measurement devices and wrong interpretation of results, Prof. Neubert in particular criticises the poor treatment of the entrusted sample material and finally concludes:
»As a result of this inappropriate sample treatment it is no more possible to directly prove high speed deformations.«
The aforementioned comments are self-explanatory and need no further explanations: The BAM results are based on the wrong samples because BAM ignored those examined by the MPA and the DN Institute in which both institutes definitely proved detonation.
*Statement by Jutta Rabe, being in fact the owner of the metal samples.
Noniin, sitten se mitä olemme kaikki odottaneet eli Meyer Werftin loppupäätelmät näistä tutkimuksista.Contact to this well acknowledged military institution was made by Brian Braidwood, who explains its background as follows:
RMCS has been a centre of expertise on military aspects of all sciences for many years. Their experience includes an enormous number of trials and experiments involving the effects of explosions on metals during the testing of military hardware. In view of this background they were approached to comment on the reports from the German laboratories on the ESTONIA samples. The person in charge is Dr. M. R. Edwards, one of the leading scientist in military explosives in the UK, who submitted the copy of a thesis by Daniel D. R. Lord on the “Effect of Explosives on Materials” from July 2000. This thesis explains the rather complicated subject of the effect of detonations also on steel plates in terms, also understandable to the layman and it is therefore attached as Enclosure No. 8. For example on page 23, photograph no. 10 shows a petalled hole caused by the military PE4 explosive placed at a distance of 12 mm from the steel plate with sand in between. The upper part of the hole, and in particular the left side, looks very similar to the explosion area of the upper starboard front bulkhead of the ESTONIA. The lower part of this almost circular hole, however, looks different, i.e. the cracked off and forward bent steel flap of the front bulkhead was caused by the welded edge structure (front bulkhead/recess) while the RMCS test involved a flat steel plate. See below.
Photograph 10. Plate AP4 on the left with approximate petalled lengths illustrated on paper model. Paper sheets were traced against petal lengths and orientated to match their positions as if they were folded flat. The paper model illustrates the amount of plastic deformation that has occurred during petalling. Some of the petals appear to overlap the shattered region, indicating an increase in original length and therefore reduction in thickness.
The test with the paper model, also shown and explained on page 23, was also done by us with the front bulkhead damage and after folding the various petals and flaps together the hole was almost closed.
On the next page the damage to the starboard upper front bulkhead and, in comparison, also of the port upper front bulkhead are shown.
<<< The port side shows just the torn open steel plates while the starboard side was obviously burst/blown open by detonation. It is also obvious that the military explosive used by MCSC which caused the circular hole above is much more powerful than the explosive used on the ESTONIA, as can be seen by the much lesser degree of petalling.
Dr. Edwards, who speaks and reads German, did not issue a formal report but commented verbally and by letter to Brian Braidwood. Dr. Edwards’ comment was:
»"I looked over the film and the hole in the starboard side is clearly a petalled hole. This is typical of what happens when a thin plate is subjected to an explosive charge. The charge has not been in direct contact with the ship plate (if this had happened the hole would not have been surrounded by the relatively large petals seen in the film).«
Brian Braidwood asked Dr. Edwards whether he would be prepared to endorse the following extract from his report, to which he agreed:
»From the Brandenburg reports, I can now conclude beyond reasonable doubt that:-
1. The structural deformation of Sample 1 was caused by an explosion.
2. The increase in hardness measured in Sample 1 was caused by an explosion.
3. Overall, the findings of these technical reports are further evidence that there was an explosion in the ESTONIA, in the vicinity of the starboard forward bulkhead from which Sample 1 was taken. «
For further details reference is made to the report of Brian Braidwood attached as Enclosure No. 5.
Liitteet:
https://www.estoniaferrydisaster.net/pd ... sure05.pdf
https://www.estoniaferrydisaster.net/pd ... sure08.pdf
In summary of the above explanations the following can be concluded:
(1) Three well acknowledged and repudiated Institutes – the MPA Brandenburg, the DN Institute, the Southwest Research Institute - have examined the relevant samples from the starboard front bulkhead and proved the existence of the decisive characteristics which can only be caused by detonation.
(2) One further well acknowledged and repudiated Institute – the BAM – also examined the same samples in combination with extensive testing and found no indications of detonative influence. The BAM however did not examine the relevant specimen previously cut off Sample No. 1 by the MPA Brandenburg, at which the MPA as well as the DN Institute had proved the decisive characteristics which can only be caused by detonation. Therefore the BAM results refer to other parts of Sample No. 1 apparently not having been affected by the shock wave caused by the detonation and thus have to be neglected.
(3) The Southwest Research Institute did examine a specimen cut off of Sample No. 1 by the MPA Brandenburg, which apparently had been moderately affected by the shock wave but not as much as the specimens cut off of the tip of Sample No. 1 which were examined by the MPA and the DN Institute. Nevertheless, the Southwest Research Institute was able to prove the existence of the relevant characteristics pointing more to detonation rather than to mechanical loads.
(4) It has thus to be concluded that at least one detonation occurred behind the upper part of the starboard front bulkhead of the ESTONIA.
The results of the BAM Examinations were published by both Spiegel TV and Spiegel Magazine in January 2001, but due to its clouded language caused considerable confusion in the public. The public discussions about explosions on board of the ESTONIA however continued, and probably because also five German citizens had lost their lives in the ESTONIA casualty the Federal General Attorney decided to commence a pretrial investigation which was subsequently delegated to one of the Hamburg prosecutors. Assisted by a team of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) this prosecutor instructed the MPA, DN, BAM and the Technical University Braunschweig to examine the relevant specimen of Sample 1 again. The responsible Professor of the Technical University Braunschweig should then evaluate the results of the other institutes and his conclusions should be binding for the prosecutor. The outcome of these renewed examinations is unknown to us, however since the prosecutor discontinued the pretrial investigation and closed the file it has to be assumed that the conclusions were negative. See in this context Chapter 9 and the comments of Prof. Neubert about the poor sample treatment by BAM, as a result of which it was no more possible to prove high speed deformations to these samples.
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